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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT Case No. 8469 
LAKE CITY, a public corporation, 
et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT CORRECTLY 
SETS FORTH THE APPLICABLE LAW 
Throughout these proceedings, appellant has er-
roneously insisted that the pre-emptive settler upon the 
school lands here involved obtained a vested right to 
the property by the mere fact of his possession. The quo-
tation at page 2 of this court's opinion plainly refutes 
appellant's contention. 
"The U. S. Supreme Court has construed 
these statutes as not conferring any vested inter-
est upon a mere settler, even though he might 
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2 
improve the property, build a home thereon, and 
reside there. In the case of Gonzales v. French, 
164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 85, 41 L. Ed. 458, the Court 
reiterated the language of Shepley v. Cowan, 91 
U.S. 330, 23 L. Ed. 424: 
" 'In those cases, Frisbie v. Whitney and 
the Yosemite Valley Case, the court decided 
that a party, by mere settlement upon the 
public lands, with an intention to obtain a 
title to the same under the pre-emption laws, 
did 'not thereby acquire such a vested interest 
in the premises as to deprive congress of 
the power to dispose of the property; that, 
notwithstanding the settlement, congress 
could reserve the lands for sale whenever 
they might be needed for public uses, as for 
arsenals, fortifications, lighthouses, custom-
houses, and other public purposes for which 
real property is required by the government; 
that the settlement, even \vhen accompanied 
with an improvement of the property, did not 
confer upon the settler any right in the land 
as against the United States, or impair in 
any respect the power of congress to dispose 
of the land in any way it might deem proper; 
that the power of regulation and disposition 
conferred upon congress by the constitution 
only ceased when all the preliminary acts 
prescribed by law for the acquisition of the 
title, including the payment of the price of 
the land, had been performed by the settler. 
\Vhen these prerequisites were con1plied 
with, the settler for the first time acquired 
a vested right in the premises of which he 
could not be subsequently deprived. He was 
then entitled to a certificate of entrY from 
the local land officers, and ultimateiy to a 
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patent of the United States. Until such pay-
ment and entry, the acts of congress gave to 
the settler only a privilege of pre-emption in 
case the lands were offered for sale in the 
usual manner; that is, the privilege to pur-
chase them in that event in preference to 
others.' 
"The case of Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S. 
232, 9 S. Ct. 509, characterizes the pre-emption 
statutes as an offer by the government, condi-
tioned upon filing a declaratory statement and 
performing certain other acts. Unless these condi-
tions are met, there is no acceptance of the of-
fer and no rights .arise in favor of the settler. 
See also Railroad v. Stringham, 38 Utah 113, 
110 P. 868, aff'd on appeal on another issue, 229 
U.S. 44,36 S. Ct. 5, 60 L. Ed. 136." 
Appellant claims that the Act of 1891 (28 Feb. 1891; 
26 Stat. 796) rather than the Act of 1859 (26 Feb. 1859; 
11 Stat. 385) is the .applicable statute and that the change 
in phraseology " ... in lieu of such as may be patented 
by pre-emptors ... " (1859) to " ... in lieu of such 
land as may be thus taken by pre-emption ... " (1891) 
has significance. The reasoning of this court's opinion 
was simply that the very statute upon which appellant 
relies makes it clear that the pre-e1nptive title had to be 
perfected before the state's right to the particular school 
section was divested. The phrase "subject to the claims" 
(1891) or ''subject to the pre-emption claim" (1859) ex-
presses this reasoning in either instance and the change 
in phraseology "1nay be patented" to "may be thus taken 
by pre-emption" does not alter the Congressional intent 
to any material extent insofar as the issue here con-
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cerned. But the fact of the matter is that D. Hendrix 
and John Prye et al. failed to file their declaratory state-
ment in the district land office within three months 
from the time of the settlement (pursuant to Sec. 2265 
Rev. Stat. 1878, 3 March 1843; 5 Stat. 620); or within 
three months from the date of the receipt at the district 
land office of the approved plat of the township (Sec. 
2266 Rev. Stat. 1878, 30 ~lay 1862; 12 Stat. 410) or 
in any event within thirty 1nonths after the date pre-
scribed for filing their declaratory notice has expired 
(Sec. 2267 Rev. Stat. 1878, 14 .July 1870; 16 Stat. 279). 
The pre-emptive right having been forfeited long before 
1891, the decision of this court correctly cites and applies 
the act of 1859. 
The single statute upon which appellant bases his 
entire case deals with the subject matter of lieu land 
selections by the state. It does not purport to obviate 
the necessity of timely compliance with the preliminary 
acts prescribed by law for the acquisition of title. The 
statutes can and 1nust be construed harmoniously. The 
Act of 1891 was passed three days before the pre-emp-
tion laws were repealed (3 ~Iar. 1891; 26 Stat. 1097) so 
the change in phraseology made it clear that lieu land 
selections could continue to be n1ade as long as all bona 
fide pre-emptive claims which had been previously in-
itiated were perfected upon due compliance with law. 
The possessory claim of the settler had to be duly 
perfected in order to prevent the statutory reservation 
to the territory for school purposes from becoming opera-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ict 
~r 
'1· 
~j .• 
; I 
5 
tive. Appellant has cited no case contrary to this pro-
position. The Supreme Court of the United States in 
Gonzales v. French, 164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 102, 41 L. Ed. 
-158 stated : 
"As they (pre-ernptioners) did not choose to 
assert their rights by filing a declaratory state-
rnent, or by making an entry as pre-emptioners, 
their mere possession did not prevent the rights 
of the territory from attaching to the school sec-
tion when the survey was made." 
This survey was made in 1878 while the school section 
was reserved to the .. A .. rizona territory in 1850. 
The federal statutory scheme of granting school sec-
tions to the various states commenced long before state-
hood. On September 9, 1850 Congress exercised its sover-
eign power and reserved for the purpose of being applied 
to schools, sections 16 and 36 in each township, in the 
Territories of New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Dakota, 
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, and in the 
States and Territories to be erected out of the same 
(9 Stat. 452). Thus Congress disposed of the tract now 
situated at 19th East Street and l(ensington Avenue in 
Section 16, T. 1 S., R. 1 E., S. L.M. The fact that this 
school land was reserved prior to the settlement by D. 
Hendrix does not make it any less operative upon his 
failure to file the required declaratory statement in the 
district land office to perfect his possessory claim. 
Appellant quotes half of a sentence only in his at-
tempt to color with authority his petition for a rehearing. 
The matter inserted in brackets below is the remaining 
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language omitted from the sentence quoted by appellant 
from Thompson v. Savidge, 110 Wash. 486, 188 Pac. 397 
at 402. 
"However, if title to the particular lands in 
question did not vest in the state upon its admis-
sion to the Union, .and has not since then vested in 
the state, because of pre-emption and homestead 
claims initiated by settlement prior to government 
survey, because of the creation of national forest 
reservations, (or because of want of government 
survey thereof, we think it plain that a relinquish-
ment of the state's claim thereto, and the exercise 
of its rights to select other lands in lieu thereof 
to which it will immediately acquire a completely 
vested title, will not be a disposition of the grant-
ed school lands of the state in violation of these 
constitutional provisions.)" 
A careful study of the above case will demonstrate 
that it lends no support whatever to .appellant's con-
tentions. ':rhe Washington Supreme Court is assuming 
that there was a valid title based on compliance with all 
the pre-en1ption requirements, in order to discuss a state 
constitutional question. The decision holds that the 
school land gr.ant "did not vest title to sections 16 and 
36 in the state prior to survey thereof.·~ In the instant 
case the survey was made in 1856, at which time the 
reservation to the territory attached. The Supreme Court 
decisions cited in the petition for rehearing squarely sup-
port the decision rendered herein. Shepley r. Cozcan, 
91 U.S. 330, 23 L. Ed. 424; Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold 
& S. Ill in. Co., 93 U.S. 634, :28 L. Ed. 995; United States 
v. Morrison, 242 U.S. 192, 36 S. Ct. 326, 60 L. Ed. 599. 
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Shepley v. Cowan is the case cited in the quotation from 
Gonzales v. French cited in this court's opinion. In 
United States v. Morrison, supra, the federal government 
withdrew school lands in the Cascade Forest Reserve, 
State of Oregon, .after the date of statehood but before 
the survey was finally accepted by the Commissioner 
of the General Land Office. The holding of the Supreme 
Court of the United States that the State of Oregon did 
not take title to the land prior to the survey is entirely 
consistent with the adjudication in the case at bar. 
The decisions of the federal Supreme Court quoted 
herein indicate that the territorial rights attached and 
became vested in this property at the time of survey, 
subject to the possibility of being divested by pre-emp-
tion. The burden was upon the individual, not the terri-
tory, to take the necessary steps to prevent title from 
passing according to the clear expression of the Organic 
Act of 1850 and the subsequent grant embodied in the 
Enabling Act of 1894. The decision of this court is clear, 
concise and correctly applies the appropriate case law 
and statutes. 
However, there is no justification for the court's 
assumption that Rennold Pender was entitled to com-
mence a suit to quiet title in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County before exhausting his administrative re-
medy. The application for federal patent which was re-
jected was made by Mr. Pender pursuant to the color 
of title act, section 1068, Title 43 U.S.C.A. The determina-
tion of whether or not ~ir. Pender qualified as a sue-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
cessor 1n interest of D. Hendrix and had a valid pre-
emptive right was a question of federal law to be deter-
mined between Pender and the District l\Ianager of the 
Bureau of Land Management. Upon consideration of 
that question and its conclusion against him, Mr. Pender's 
only recourse was to appeal to the Director of the Bureau 
of Land ~Ianagement. See Section 221.5 of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Bureau of Land l\1:anagement pub-
lished at page 461 of 43 Code of Federal Regulations-
There is a statement in the last paragraph of Mr. 
House's letter of rejection to the effect that: 
"Until the adverse conflicting claim of the 
State of Utah is eliminated, the application of 
Pender to purchase the land under the claim of 
color of title may not be considered favorably." 
But, there is no authority in the statutes, or regulations, 
for the Bureau of Land Management to divest itself of 
jurisdiction in this matter. This question of the com-
mencement of proceedings in the district court should 
not be confused with the statutory authorization of such 
proceedings to determine adverse claims to application 
for mining patent under section 30 Title 30 U.S.C.A. 
There is no authority whateyer for the failure of Pender 
to appeal to the Director of the Bureau of Land l\1anage-
ment, but bring a quiet title suit instead. 
The motion for sunuuary judg1uent in this case can 
be sustained for the sole reason that Pender does not 
claim under any p.atent whatsoever, and the district 
courts of this state are not the proper forun1 for him to 
attempt to obtain one. Respondent submits that the opin-
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ion of this court should not infer that the district courts 
of this state are available to applicants aggrieved by 
decisions of the Bureau of Land Management concerning 
color of title applications, until they have duly complied 
with the prescribed administrative procedure. Sections 
57 to 60 inclusive, on Public Lands in 42 Am. J ur. review 
this matter thoroughly and at page 837 it is stated: 
"In the absence of fraud, the decisions of the 
officers of the Land Department of the govern-
ment as to matters within their jurisdiction are 
final and conclusive, except as they may be re-
versed on appeal in that department." 
The statement in the opinion of this court that after 
notification of rejection of his application "Pender then 
filed a quiet title suit ... " is erroneous since the com-
plaint was filed M.ay 6, 1952 and the letter of rejection of 
application is dated July 9, 1952. 
It is respectfully suggested that this sentence be 
corrected and the additional sentence inserted at the con-
clusion of the opinion : 
"At any rate as Pender did not appeal from 
the decision of the District Manager of the Bureau 
of L.and Management, he must be deemed to have 
acquiesced therein and concluded thereby. Gon-
zales v. French, Railroad v. Stringham, supra." 
See the additional case's to this effect .at page 24 of re-
spondent's brief. 
Nothing has been presented by appellant's petition 
for rehearing which has not been considered and deter-
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mined in the court's decision. The petition should be 
denied for as the court states: 
"Under the U.S. Supreme Court cases cited 
supra the only possible conclusion to be drawn in 
the present case is that appellant has no rights 
whatever in the property." 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
RICHARD H. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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